Abstract. Motivated by the need to have secure blind signatures even in the presence of quantum computers, we present two efficient blind signature schemes based on hard worst-case lattice problems. Both schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model and unconditionally blind. The first scheme is based on preimage samplable functions that were introduced at STOC 2008 by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan. The scheme is stateful and runs in 3 moves. The second scheme builds upon the PKC 2008 identification scheme of Lyubashevsky. It is stateless, has 4 moves, and its security is based on the hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices.
Introduction
Since 1982, when Chaum proposed his idea of blind signatures [Cha83] , it has become an important primitive for anonymous Internet banking, e-voting applications (e.g. [RHOAGZ07, Kim04] ), as well as for multi-party computation such as oblivious transfer [CNS07] . These applications will retain their importance in both, near and far future. As for the near future, we are convinced that current factoring and discrete logarithm based instantiations are efficient and secure. But for how long?
Today, when building provably secure cryptographic schemes, one has to keep emerging technologies and especially quantum computers in mind. In the quantum-age, the cryptographic assumptions change with the leap in computing power that quantum computers will provide.
There are only a few cryptographic assumptions that are conjectured to be post-quantum, i.e. they are considered to withstand quantum computer attacks. One of those assumptions is the hardness of finding short vectors in a lattice. There is also a benefit of building cryptography upon hard lattice problems today because, unlike factoring or computing discrete logarithms, they have withstood even subexponential attacks and the best known algorithm [AKS01] is exponential in the lattice dimension. Furthermore, lattice problems typically allow a worst-case to average-case reduction that goes back to Ajtai [Ajt96] . It states that a randomly chosen instance of a certain lattice problem is at least as hard as the worst-case instance of a related lattice problem. The reduction was later on adapted to work with ideal lattices by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [LM06] .
According to the security model, mainly influenced by Juels, Luby, and Ostrovsky [JLO97] as well as Pointcheval and Stern [PS00] , blind signature schemes have to satisfy blindness and onemore unforgeability. Blindness states that the signer must not obtain any information on the signed messages and one-more unforgeability enforces that an adversarial user cannot obtain more signatures than there were interactions with the signer.
Our contribution
We construct two lattice-based blind signatures. One is based on preimage samplable functions that were introduced by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan (GPV) [GPV08] along with a digital signature scheme. The scheme is stateful, unconditionally blind, one-more unforgeable if a certain interactive assumption (similar to the one-more trapdoor inversion assumption in [BNPS03] for RSA) holds, and has three moves. The scheme is presented using general (not ideal) lattices but recently Stehlé, Seinfeld, Tanaka, and Xagawa [SSTX09] showed how to improve the GPV signature scheme using ideal lattices. Their modifications are directly applicable to our blind signature scheme and significantly reduce the public-key size.
Our second construction is far stronger. It is built upon Lyubashevsky's identification and signature scheme [Lyu08b, Lyu08a] . It is also unconditionally blind and one-more unforgeable if standard lattice problems in ideal lattices are hard in the worst-case. With its four rounds it is still very efficient, i.e., all operations have quasi-linear complexity and all keys and signatures require a quasi-linear amount of bits. In both schemes, we establish blindness via an abstraction of the filtering technique from [Lyu08a] .
We believe that our work is an important contribution and that we solve a longstanding problem because the previous efficient constructions, like [Cha83] , [PS97] , [PS00] , [Abe01] , [BNPS03] , [CKW04] , [KZ05] , [Oka06] , have one thing in common: they are built upon classic number theoretic assumptions, like the hardness of factoring large integers or computing discrete logarithms. The newer approaches of Boldyreva [Bol03] and Okamoto [Oka06] tend to use pairings and bilinear maps that yield very elegant constructions. They, however, are again based on the discrete logarithm problem in this specific setting. None of the above schemes withstands subexponential attacks or remains secure in the presence of reasonably large quantum computers, where both factoring and computing discrete logarithms become easy due to the seminal work of Shor [Sho97] .
Finally, we would like to mention that there are also (typically inefficient) instantiations from general assumptions, e.g. by Juels, Luby, and Ostrovsky [JLO97] , Fischlin [Fis06] , and Hazay, Katz, Koo, and Lindell [HKKL07] . Whether they are post-quantum, largely depends on the exact realization of primitives.
Organization
After a preliminaries section with a brief introduction to lattice theory and the relevant security models, we present our constructions in Sections 3 and 4. The instantiation in Section 3 is based on a trapdoor function in lattices, whereas the one in Section 4 is based on an identification scheme in ideal lattices. There, we also prove that our scheme has the well-established security properties.
Preliminaries
With n, we always denote the security parameter. (a, b) ← A(x), B(y) denotes the joint execution of two algorithms A and B in an interactive protocol with private inputs x to A and y to B. The private outputs are a for A and b for B. A(x), B(y) k means that the interaction can take place up to k times.
x $ ← X means that x is chosen uniformly at random from the finite set X. Recall that the statistical distance of two random variables X, Y over a domain D is defined as ∆(X,
A function is negligible in n if it vanishes faster than 1/p(n) for any polynomial p(n).
In the following, we recall the definitions of blind signatures and commitments. Afterwards, we briefly recall the forking lemma and some necessary facts from lattice theory.
Blind signatures
respective protocol. Two views V 1 and V 2 are considered equal if they cannot be distinguished by any computationally unbounded algorithm with noticeable probability.
As for security, blind signatures have to satisfy two properties: blindness and one-more unforgeability [JLO97, PS00] . The notion of blindness is defined in the following experiment Exp blind S * ,BS , where the adversarial signer S * chooses two messages M 0 , M 1 and interacts with two users who obtain blind signatures for the two messages in random order. Note that the executions of the two users may be arbitrarily interleaved. After seeing the unblinded signatures in the original order, with respect to M 0 , M 1 , the signer has to guess the message that has been signed for the first user. If either of the user algorithms fails in outputting a valid signature, the signer is merely notified of the failure and does not get any signature. In particular, he does not see which user algorithm aborted.
Let s b and s 1−b be the outputs of U(pk, M b ) and U(pk, M 1−b ), respectively. If s 0 = fail and
A signature scheme BS is (t, δ)-blind, if there is no adversary S * , running in time at most t, that wins the above experiment with advantage at least δ, where the advantage is defined as
The second security property, one-more unforgeability, ensures that each completed interaction between signer and user yields at most one signature. It is formalized in the following experiment Exp omf U * ,BS , where an adversarial user tries to output  valid signatures after <  completed interactions with an honest signer.
Let be the number of (complete) interaction between U * and the signer. Return 1 iff 1.
A signature scheme BS is (t, q Sign , q H , δ)-one-more unforgeable if there is no adversary A, running in time at most t, making at most q Sign signature queries and at most q H hash oracle queries, that wins the above experiment with probability at least δ.
Commitments
Commitments typically work in two phases. First, one party publishes a commitment C = com(M ; r) to a message M without revealing any information about it. This is the "hiding" property of the commitment scheme. In the second phase, the party can prove that C actually corresponds to M by revealing r. It is important that no algorithm can find a second message M and randomness r such that C = com(M ; r ) -the "binding" property. A scheme is (t, δ)-hiding (-binding) if there is no algorithm running in time at most t that can break the hiding (binding) property with probability at least δ. Both properties can be satisfied computationally or unconditionally but there is no scheme that is unconditionally hinding and unconditionally binding [Gol04] . For our schemes, we want blindness to be as strong as possible, which is why we assume the existence of a unconditionally hiding and computationally binding commitment scheme that is (t, δ com )-binding for any polynomial t in n.
As we are interested in fully lattice-based schemes, we would like to point out that commitment schemes can be built upon on hard lattice problems [KTX08] .
Forking Lemma
The generalized forking lemma of Bellare and Neven [BN06] is an important tool for proving security in the random oracle model. It provides a lower bound for the probability that a randomized algorithm outputs two related values when run twice with the same random tape but with a different random oracle. We use it in Section 4 to prove one-more unforgeability.
Lemma 2.1 (Lemma 1 in [BN06] ) Fix an integer q ≥ 1 and a set H of size h ≥ 2. Let A be a randomized algorithm that on input x, h 1 , . . . , h q returns a pair, the first element of which is an integer in the range 0, . . . , q and the second element of which we refer to as a side output. Let IG be a randomized algorithm that we call the input generator. The accepting probability of A, denoted acc, is defined as the probability that J ≥ 1 in the experiment
The forking algorithm F A associated to A is the randomized algorithm that takes input x proceeds as follows:
Pick coins ρ for A at random , where an algorithm is given a description, a basis, of a lattice Λ and is supposed to find the shortest vector v ∈ Λ\{0} with respect to a certain p norm (up to an approximation factor). More precisely, find a vector v ∈ Λ \ {0}, such that v p ≤ γ w p for all w ∈ Λ \ {0} for a fixed approximation factor γ ≥ 1. This problem is known to be N P-hard for all p norms [Din02, RR06, Kho05] with a constant approximation factor. For exponential (in the lattice dimension) approximation factors, the problem is solvable in polynomial time by the famous LLL algorithm by Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász [LLL82] . For polynomial approximation factors, which are relevant for cryptography, the best known algorithm is exponential (space and time) [AKS01] . We refer the interested reader to a recent survey [Reg07] by Regev for the currently known "approximability" and "inapproximability" results. The practical hardness of these lattice problems is analyzed in [GN08, BLR08] .
Lattices
In the special case of modular lattices, there is also a special version of the SVP, named short integer solution problem (SIS). There, an algorithm is given a basis of Λ ⊥ q (A) and is supposed to output a non-zero solution v ∈ Z m q to the above equation. The algorithm succeeds if v p ≤ ν for a given norm bound ν. The SIS was, in principle, introduced by Ajtai [Ajt96] and its hardness is analyzed in [MR07] and [GPV08] . The latter work also explicitly deals with the ∞ norm, which we will use in our security proofs. We write SIS p (m, q, ν) for the SIS problem in m-dimensional lattices Λ ⊥ q (A) with norm bound ν w.r.t. the p norm. The problem is (t, δ)-hard if no algorithm that runs in time t can solve it with probability at least δ. Similarly, the inhomogeneous version (find a short v with Av ≡ y, for a given y = 0) is denoted with ISIS p (m, q, ν). Yet another special class of lattices are ideal lattices. In particular, consider lattices corresponding to ideals in the ring R = Z q [X]/ X n + 1 . We identify f ∈ R with its coefficient vector f = (f 0 , . . . , f n−1 ) ∈ Z n q . Furthermore, we denote elements of the R-module R m witĥ a = (a 0 , . . . , a m−1 ) or directly with (a 0 , . . . , a mn−1 ) ∈ Z mn q . Consequently, we define f ∞ = (f 0 , . . . , f n−1 ) ∞ . A lattice corresponds to an ideal I if and only if every lattice vector is the coefficient vector of a polynomial in I. The above problems SIS and ISIS easily translate to ideal lattices.
Both, ideal SIS and SIS are considered as average-case problems, which are directly related to uniformly random chosen problem instances in lattice cryptography. By a worst-case to averagecase reduction [Ajt96, LM06] they are provably at least as hard as all instances of ideal SVP (ISVP) resp. SVP in a certain smaller dimension.
Blind signatures from preimage samplable functions
In this section, we describe our blind signature scheme and prove its security in terms of blindness and one-more unforgeability. It is based on the signature scheme by Gentry et al. [GPV08] and we describe it in terms of general lattices. However, following the ideas of [SSTX09] , there is also a version using ideal lattices, which has a significantly shorter public keys.
The roadmap for this section is as follows: We describe the 3-round blind signature scheme BS = (Kg, Sign, Vf) after briefly recalling the concept of preimage samplable functions as they will be needed in our construction. Then, we prove unconditional blindness and one-more unforgeability based on an interactive assumption that is related to a certain lattice prolem but not equivalent.
The underlying family of preimage samplable trapdoor functions is a triple (TrapGen, SampleDom, SamplePre), with the following specification.
Trapdoor generation. TrapGen(1 n ) outputs (a, t), where a fully defines the function f a : D n → R n and the trapdoor t is used to sample from the inverse f
, and the range is R n = Z n q . SamplePre samples preimages from a subset
Evaluation. The function f a (x) outputs Ax mod q, where A ∈ Z n×m q is part of the public key a.
Domain sampling with uniform output. SampleDom(n) draws samples from some distribution over D n , such that their images under f a are uniformly distributed over R n (cf. [GPV08] ).
Preimage sampling. Let y ∈ R n . f −1 t (y) samples x ← SampleDom(n) under the condition that f a (x) = y. There are at least ω(log(n)) such preimages for every image y.
One-wayness. Computing an inverse of the function f a : D n → R n is infeasible without the trapdoor t as long as
Note that we slightly modified the original setting regarding the sets D n , D n . In [GPV08] , it is always the same, whereas we have introduced different D n , D n for trapdoor evaluation and preimage sampling, respectively. As in the original work, we will always assume that the above properties, especially the statistical distributions, hold for f a in a perfect sense. Using a proposition from [GPV08] , we can establish the following corollary for our choice of parameters:
Corollary 3.1 Let n, m, q, D, x as above. If there is a polynomial time (in n) algorithm that breaks SIS with ν (or ISIS with ν) with non-negligible probability then there is another polynomial time algorithm that solves SIVP (a variant of SVP) with approximation factors γ ≥ ν O( √ n) in all lattices of dimension n.
In addition to the above trapdoor function, we need a full-domain hash function (cf. [BR93] ) H ← H(1 n ), where H : {0, 1} * → R n and H is a family of collision resistant hash functions. We assume that there is no polynomial time algorithm that finds collisions but with negligible probability δ H .
Our blind signature scheme BS = (Kg, Sign, Vf) is defined as follows.
Key generation. BS.Kg(1 n ) outputs (a, t) ← TrapGen(1 n ), where a is the public verification key and t is the secret signing key, and sets up a list of already signed messages L M = {0} ⊆ R n .
Signature protocol. Let D β = {x ∈ Z m : x ∞ ≤ xmD}. The signature issue protocol for messages M ∈ {0, 1} * is shown in Figure 1 . The user employs a commitment scheme com : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} * that is unconditionally hiding and computationally binding (but with probability δ com ). Note that the blind signature scheme is stateful, i.e. the signer does not sign a blinded message µ twice and it does not sign µ = 0 ∈ R n in particular 1 . The result is s ∈ D n .
Verification. BS.Vf(a, (r, s), M ) outputs 1 iff s ∈ D n and f a (s) = H(com(M ; r)).
Completeness. The scheme BS is complete with constant probability e −1/x because for all honestly generated key pairs (a, t), all messages M ∈ {0, 1} * , and all signatures (r, s), we have
). Assuming σ ∈ D n , we also have BS.Vf(a, s, M ) = 1. This happens with constant probability as shown in the following probabilistic lemma with k = n, A = D, B = xmD.
. Therefore, the probability for this event is
Setting x ≥ 2, we expect the protocol to be complete in a single run. If the protocol fails, the user simply reveals the current interaction (com(M ; r), β, σ) to the signer in order to prove that the execution failed. If the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, the user does not reveal any information about M . Then, the protocol is repeated with fresh values for r and β. Observe that this does not affect the upcoming security analysis because the individual protocol runs are indepedent. In particular, the hiding property of com can be directly used in the blindness proof and the binding property is used in the proof of unforgeability.
1 Signing 0 would result in a short vector in Λ ⊥ q (A) and help learn the private signing key similar to the method in [NR06] . Due to the linearity of fa, the same applies if a message is signed twice.
Output (M, (r, s)) Blindness. We prove that BS is unconditionally blind, i.e. (∞, 0)-blind, if com is unconditionally hiding. If it is only statistically or computationally hiding, the blind signature scheme is also statistically resp. computationally hiding. The intuition is that the signer only sees random elements from R n after the user has applied a random blinding value. The output signature is again randomized by a sufficiently large value β, which hides the internal ordinary signature.
Theorem 3.3 (Blindness) The blind signature scheme BS is (∞, 0)-blind.
Proof.
The idea of the proof is that, given the signer's view in the experiment Exp blind S * ,BS , it cannot relate M and µ and it cannot distinguish the whether σ hides a signature on M 0 or M 1 . The former is due to the fact that f a is regular [Lyu08a] for uniformly random chosen inputs β ∈ D β but with 2 −ω(n) statistical distance from uniform over R n . The latter is a consequence of the following probabilistic lemma (Lemma 3.4) with k = n, A = D, B = xmD. Furthermore, since the commitment scheme is unconditionally hiding, the signer cannot learn anything about the message by aborting the protocol because the views for independent runs for the same message are completely independent as the user does not ever reveal the randomness r for a failed interaction and the blinded message µ is always uniformly distributed over R n . Thus, we infer that the signer can only guess b with probability 1/2.
Proof (Lemma 3.4). By definition, the statistical distance is
Observe that a − c ∞ , a − c ∞ ≤ A + (B − A) = B and b ∞ ≤ B. Hence, the probability in either case is 1/(2B + 1) k and the statistical distance is 0.
In the context of blindness, the above lemma states that the signer cannot distinguish whether a given blind signature σ is of the form s b − β or s 1−b − β, where s b is valid for M b and s 1−b is valid for M 1−b . This conludes the proof of blindness.
One-more unforgeability. We prove that our blind signature scheme is unforgeable under a special assumption, namely that the following "one-more trapdoor inversion problem" is hard. does not answer queries twice and its does not invert 0 ∈ R n and it returns preimages in D n . The problem is (t, q I , q O , δ)-hard if there is no algorithm A, running in time at most t, making at most q I inversion queries, and at most q O queries to O Rn , which wins the above experiment with probability at least δ. The one-wayness of f a gives us (poly(n), 0, 1, δ)-hardness, which we will extend to (poly(n), poly(n), poly(n), δ )-hardness for a negligible δ . With our definition and this assumption, we follow the line of thought of Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval, and Semanko in [BNPS03] . They define a collection of "one-more" problems in the RSA context, which are perfectly tailored for proving one-more unforgeability. In [BMV08] , Bresson, Monnerat, and Vergnaud give a separation result on these "one-more" problems, showing that they cannot be proven equivalent to "simple" RSA inversion. The same seems to apply here. There is also a recent work on so-called adaptive one-way functions by Pandey, Pass, and Vaikuntanathan [PPV08] , which discusses similar assumptions.
Def inition 3.5 (Chosen target trapdoor inversion problem (CTTI)) The chosen target trapdoor inversion problem is defined via the following experiment Exp

Experiment Exp
In the following, we will assume (poly(n), poly(n), poly(n), δ)-hardness of CTTI on the grounds that it is directly related to the provably hard problem of forging GPV signatures. In both cases, one has to find a solution x ∈ D n to the equation f a (x) = y for a given y, while knowing polynomially many distinct preimage-image pairs.
Theorem 3.6 (One-more unforgeability) Let T Sig and T H be the cost functions for simulating the oracles Sig and H, respectively. The BS blind signature scheme is (t, q Sign , q H , δ)-one-more unforgeable if the CTTI is (t, q Sig , q H , δ − δ H − δ com )-hard.
Proof. Towards contradiction, we assume that there exists a successful forger A against one-more unforgeability of BS. Using A, we construct an algorithm B via a black-box simulation, such that B solves the respective instance of the CTTI. The simulation works as follows. 
Blind signature queries. On input µ, algorithm B searches a pair (µ, σ) in L I . If it exists, B returns σ. Otherwise, algorithm B increments , queries its inversion oracle σ ← f −1 t (µ), stores (µ ← µ, σ ) in L I , and returns σ . 1 , (r 1 , s 1 ) 
Output. Finally, A stops and outputs ((M
which the protocol was aborted and sets π = {(i, j) : f a (σ i − β i ) = H(C j )} to account for the inversions that are not used by A. It outputs (π ∪ π , s 1 , . . . ,
Analysis. First, observe that all of A's oracles are perfectly simulated. When A calls H, algorithm B draws a new challenge from its challenge oracle. Whenever A queries its signature oracle on a new blinded message, B calls its inversion oracle. Therefore, when A outputs a one-more forgery, B can use it to solve CTTI. Firstly, we have to rule out that the user has an additional advantage via user-side aborts. Consider the case, where the user outputs a (fake) result = (C , β ) that satisfies the abort conditions H(C ) + f a (β ) = µ and σ − β ∈ D n , while obtaining a valid signature s = σ − β ∈ D n for C = com(M ; r). If C = C , the simulation outputs two distinct preimages σ − β and σ − β for C, which is valid in the CTTI experiment. If C = C , the simulations records σ − β as a preimage for H(C ) and outputs it at the end and H(C) = H(C ) but with probability δ H . Hence, even with aborts, B is able to output the required number of preimages for solving CTTI.
Secondly, assume that all the s 1 , . . . , s  are distinct. Then, B's output is valid in the CTTI experiment because all preimages are small and evaluate to challenges received from O Rn and the number of output inversions k is greater than the number of inversion queries and from with the previous paragraph we know that aborts contribute valid additional preimages that are different from the s 1 , . . . , s  .
Finally, assume there is a pair (M, (r, s)), (M , (r , s)) in A's output with M = M such that H(com(M ; r)) = f a (s) = H(com(M ; r )). That either implies a collision under H or a successful attack against the binding property of com.
Thus, if A succeeds with probability δ, B succeeds with probabiltiy δ − δ H − δ com .
Blind signatures from ideal lattices
In this section, we construct a second lattice-based blind signature scheme. Here, the construction is not built upon a trapdoor, which allows us to fully simulate the scheme in our security proofs and give very strong arguments for one-more unforgeability. The underlying signature scheme is due to Lyubashevsky [Lyu08b] . Both, Lyubashevsky's signature scheme and our blind signature scheme are secure in the random oracle model under a worst-case assumption in ideal lattices and their time and space complexity is only O(n).
The roadmap for this section is as follows: We describe the 4-round blind signature scheme BS = (Kg, Sign, Vf). Then, we prove unconditional blindness and one-more unforgeability based on the assumptions that solving ISVP in dimension n is hard in the worst case.
For the setup, we need the global parameters in Table 1 , where R = Z p [X]/ X n +1 . The scheme relies on the lattice-based collision resistant hash function family H(R, D, m) by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [LM06] . We fix a random h
Note that the function is linear over R m , i.e., h(a(x +ŷ) = a(h(x) + h(ŷ)) for all a ∈ R,x,ŷ ∈ R m . In addition, finding a collision (x, x ) ∈ D 2 under h, i.e. solving Col(h, D) or alternatively ideal SIS ∞ with ν = |D| 1/n − 1, implies being able to solve ISVP ∞ in every lattice that corresponds to an ideal in R. More formally, from [Lyu08b] , we know: Table 1 : Parameters for the security parameter n.
, and p ≥ 4dmn √ n log(n). An adversary C that solves the Col(h, D) problem, i.e., finds two preimagesx,ŷ ∈ D m such that h(x) = h(ŷ), can be used to solve ISVP ∞ with an approximation factor of γ ≥ 16dmn log 2 (n) in every lattice that corresponds to an ideal in Z[X]/ f .
Furthermore, we need a random oracle H $ ← H(1 n ) mapping {0, 1} * → D . Again, there is no polynomial time algorithm that finds collisions but with negligible probability δ H .
Key generation. BS.Kg(1 n ) selects a secret keyŝ $ ← D m s and computes the public key S ← h(ŝ). The output is (ŝ, S).
Signature protocol. The signature issue protocol for messages M ∈ {0, 1} * is depicted in Figure 2 .
Note that values controlled by the user are written as Greek letter and those controlled by the signer are in Latin. In the first step, the user employs a commitment scheme com : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} * that we assume to be unconditionally hiding and computationally binding (but with probability δ com ).
Whenever the signer triggers a restart, the user chooses a fresh r in order to make the protocol execution independent of the previous one. Therefore, we omit values from previous runs in the signer's view. The signer can also detect a cheating user that tries to trigger a restart although it has received a valid signature. In this case, the signer can stop the protocol and assume that the user has obtained a valid signature.
Eventually, the user outputs (r,ẑ, ).
Verification. BS.Vf(a, (r,ẑ, ), M ) outputs 1 iffẑ ∈ G m and H(h(ẑ) − S , com(M ; r)) = .
Signer S(ŝ)
Start over with fresh α *
Figure 2: Issue protocol of the blind signature scheme BS.
Completeness. Assuming that the protocol does not abort, then for all honestly generated key pairs (ŝ, S), all messages M ∈ {0, 1} * , and all signatures (r,ẑ, ) we haveẑ ∈ G m and h(ẑ)
and com(M ; r) = C. Therefore H(h(ẑ) − S , com(M ; r)) = and BS.Vf(s, (r,ẑ, ), M ) = 1. Potentially, the protocol has to be restarted a couple of times at three stages. First, the user may have to "start over with a fresh α", which is not noticed by the signer. Applying Lemma 3.2 on − α ∈ D * (k = n, A = 1, B = xn) yields a constant probability for this event.
Second, the signer may abort in caseẑ * ∈ G m * in order to hide its secret key. The probability for not aborting here is again constant by Lemma 3.2 (k = mn, A = √ n log(n)(xn − 1), B = √ n log(n)(x 2 n 2 m − xnm)) because ŝ * ∞ ≤ √ n log(n)(xn − 1) but with negligible probability for randomly chosen * by [Lyu08b, Lemma 2.11].
Third, the user might abort ifẑ ∈ G m . Again, Lemma 3.2 with k = mn, A = √ n log(n)(x 2 n 2 m − xnm − xn + 1), and B = √ n log(n)(x 3 n 3 m 2 − x 2 n 2 m 2 − x 2 n 2 m + xnm) provides that it will not abort with constant probability.
Thus, we only need a logarithmic (in n) number of trials to pass each of these aborts. In practice, 2 trials are sufficient for each of them and by choosing x ≥ 3 we expect the protocol to be complete in a single run.
Observe that all operations in BS have O(n) complexity and that private keys, public keys, and signatures have size O(n).
Blindness. We prove that our scheme is (∞, 0)-blind based on the observation that the signer only sees values that are statistically independent of the message being signed. More precisely, the views generated by two different messages are indistinguishable. Proof. Assuming that the signer can even control M 0 , M 1 in the blindness experiment, we show that the users involved do not leak any information about their respective message whatsoever. Technically, we establish that * , r,ẑ, and (interpreted as random variables) are distributed independently of the message being signed. As for and r we need not worry as they are chosen uniformly at random. Moreover, we need not worry about aborts in the protocol as the user makes individual runs of the protocol completely independent by choosing fresh values for r, α,β and it never reveals r for a commitment C that was used in an aborted run. Since com is unconditionally hiding, the revealed commitment does not leak any information about the message. Distribution ofẑ. Withẑ 0 ,ẑ 1 we denote parts of the final output of U(pk, M 0 ) resp. U(pk, M 1 ). Both are of the formẑ * −β forẑ * ∈ G m * and a randomly chosenβ ∈ D m β . Forthermore,ẑ 0 andẑ 1 are forced to be in G m . Hence, their statistical distance ∆(ẑ 0 ,ẑ 1 ) is 0 because of Lemma 3.4 with k = mn, A = √ n log(n)(x 2 n 2 m − xnm − xn + 1), B = √ n log(n)(x 3 n 3 m 2 − x 2 n 2 m 2 − x 2 n 2 m + xnm) and the fact that their coefficients are bounded by
which is exactly the norm bound enforced by "∈ G m ".
One-more unforgeability. BS is one-more unforgeable if there is at least one ideal lattice, corresponding to an ideal in R, within which the ISVP ∞ is hard. We will use the forking lemma [PS00, BN06] to obtain a solution to the collision problem Col(h, D), which can be used to find short lattice vectors in the worst case via Theorem 4.1. Col(h, D) is (t, δ)-hard if no t-time adversary can solve it with probability at least δ. For our proof, it is crucial that the blind signature scheme is witness-indistinguishable with respect to the private keyŝ, i.e., there are at least two distinctŝ,ŝ ∈ D s with h(ŝ) = h(ŝ ) such that no efficient algorithm can distinguish whetherŝ orŝ was used by the signer with probability more than 1/2 + 2 −ω(log(n)) . We then use the forking lemma and "hope" that the adversary in the one-more unforgeability experiment outputs a signature that corresponds to a private keyŝ , while we useŝ in the simulation. Our scheme is witness-indistinguishable because it yields valid signatures for the witness-indistinguishable signature scheme in [Lyu08b] .
Theorem 4.3 (One-more unforgeability) Let T Sig and T H be the cost functions for simulating the oracles Sig and H, respectively, and let c < 1 be the constant probability with which one protocol run has to be aborted. BS is (t, q Sign , q H , δ)-one-more unforgeable if Col(h, D) is (t , δ )-hard with t = t + q Sig T Sig + q H T H and non-negligible δ if and only if δ is non-negligible.
Proof. Towards contradiction, we assume that there exists a successful forger A against one-more unforgeability of BS. Using A, we construct an algorithm B via a black-box simulation, such that B solves the collision problem Col(h, D). Blind signature queries. On input * , B acts according to BS.Sign.
Output. Finally, A stops and outputs
Algorithm B guesses an index k $ ← {1, . . . , } such that h ı = k . Then, B starts over, running
Note that both A and B run with the same random tape as in the first run. Among other values,
Analysis. Observe that A's environment is perfectly simulated. Especially, signer-side and userside aborts happen with the same probability as in the original protocol. The probability that B guesses k correctly, i.e. the k-th output of A corresponds to a signature that was not obtained via honestly following the protocol, is at least 1/ ≥ 1/(q Sign + 1). Note that k is a random oracle answer but with probability 1/|D |.
Applying Lemma 2.1 (Forking Lemma) we know that with probability ≥ (1 − c)(δ − 1/|D |)((δ − 1/|D |)/q H − 1/|D |), A is again successful in the one-more unforgeability experiment and outputs (M k , (r k ,ẑ k , k )) using the same random oracle query as in the first run. Observe that the (1 − c) factor takes signer-side aborts into account, which happen with probability at most c. Therefore, we know that (h(ẑ k − S k ), com(M k ; r k )) = (h(ẑ k − S k ), com(M k ; r k )). Now, we turn to solving the collision problem. We have to show thatẑ k −ŝ k =ẑ k −ŝ k and h(ẑ k −ŝ k ) = h(ẑ k −ŝ k ). The second requirement follows directly from the previous paragraph and from the fact that we knowŝ. The first is tricker. Here, it is important that the protocol is witness-indistinguishable, i.e., the adversary does not recognize whether we used one of at least two possibleŝ,ŝ with probability greater than 1/2 + 2 −ω(log(n)) . Thus, with probability at least 1/2 − 2 −ω(log(n)) it will output signatures that correspond toŝ . We apply the same proof technique as in [Lyu08b] to show that eitherẑ k −ŝ k =ẑ k −ŝ k orẑ k −ŝ k =ẑ k −ŝ k . Assume both are equal, we substract the equations and obtain ( k − )(ŝ −ŝ) = 0. We know that k − = 0. Now, ( k − )(ŝ −ŝ) ∞ ≤ 4n < q/2 because k − ∞ , ŝ −ŝ ∞ ≤ 2. Thus, ( k − )(ŝ −ŝ) = 0 over Z[X]/ X n + 1 (without mod q), which is an integral domain. So, we have the contradiction s =ŝ and a collision with probability 1/2 − 2 −ω(log(n)) becauseẑ k −ŝ k ,ẑ k −ŝ k ∈ D. The success probability of this strategy is at least
which is non-negligible if δ is non-negligible. Concerning aborts, we argue that the user cannot obtain a valid signature out of an aborted interaction. In order to trigger an abort it outputs result = (C , α ,β , ) which, together witĥ z * ,ŷ, * , satisfies all abort criteria. Assume that it obtains a valid signature (r,ẑ,ˆ ) from this interaction. If = , then h(ẑ * −β * −ŝ ) = h(ẑ −ŝ ) but with probability δ com . If the arguments under h are equal, we haveẑ =ẑ * −β ∈ G m -a contradiction. If the arguments are distinct, we have a collision in D. If = , but necessarily * = − α = − α for an α = α, we know that α = − + α . So, the adversary has to be able to predict the output of H, which it can only achieve with probability 1/|D |. The probability that we can extract a collision from a cheating user during an abort is at least
which is non-negligible if δ is non-negligible. Thus, the overall success probability of the reduction is δ = min(δ frk , δ abort ).
By Theorem 4.1, we get the following, strong security guarantees.
Corollary 4.4 BS is one-more unforgeable if solving ISVP ∞ is hard in the worst case for approximation factors γ ≥ 16mn √ n log 2 (n)(x 3 n 3 m 2 − x 2 n 2 m 2 − 2x 2 n 2 m + 2xnm + xn) = O(n 4 √ n) in lattices that correspond to ideals in R.
Comparing Corollary 4.4 with Corollary 3.1 may lead to the conclusion that the scheme in Section 3 has stronger security guarantees. This, however, is not the case because it is not provably as hard to break as finding collisions under the employed trapdoor function. Corollary 3.1 is a mere indication of hardness while Corollary 4.4 is an actual reduction from worst-case lattice problems.
Conclusions
We have shown how to construct efficient and provably secure blind signature schemes based on worst-case lattice problems. Our first construction is comparable to RSA blind signatures, which also rely on an interactive assumption. However, our second construction is provably secure without such assumptions and directly relies on the hardness of standard lattice problems, which are conjectured to be intractable even by quantum computers and subexponential attacks. All in all, our second scheme is the preferred scheme for practical purposes as it is more efficient and has stronger security guarantees.
